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Abstract
In this note we show that McGee’s ω-inconsistency result can be derived from Lo¨b’s
theorem.
In his paper “How Truthlike Can a Predicate be?” McGee (1985) showed theω-inconsistency
of a broad family of theories of truth. The purpose of this note is to highlight the connection
between McGee’s result and Lo¨b’s theorem. Once this connection is made explicit McGee’s
ω-inconsistency resultmay be viewed as a variant ofGo¨del’s second incompleteness theorem.
For expository purposeswe start by providingMcGee’s result roughly following his original
derivation.1
Theorem 1 (McGee). Let Γ be a theory extending Q in the language LT, which is closed under the
rule
(T-Intro)
φ
Tpφq
and proves
(Cons) Tp¬φq→ ¬Tpφq
(T-Imp) Tpφ→ ψq→ (Tpφq→ Tpψq)
(UInf) ∀xTpφ(x˙)q→ Tp∀vφ(v)q
for all φ,ψ ∈ SentLT . Then Γ is ω-inconsistent.
A theory is ω-inconsistent if there exists a formula φ(x) such that the theory proves
¬∀xφ and φ(n) for all n ∈ ω. In other words, if we allow for one application of the ω-rule
∗After I had finished a draft of this note I discovered that basically the same point has been made in (Leitgeb,
2001, Theorem 11). This put an end to the idea of publishing the note. Since in the present note the point is made
in a slightly different and, I believe, crisper way I decided nonetheless to make the note publicly available. I wish
to thank Matteo Zichetti, who drew my attention to a rather important typo in an earlier version of this note.
1On notation: L is a standard arithmetical language with the exception that we assume the existence of
certain function symbols in the language. In particular we assume the existence of the function symbol f •
(cf. below). LT (LP) is the extension of L by a unary predicate T (P). We assume some standard coding scheme
for the expressions of the languages under consideration and denote the name of the code of an expression η by
pηq. The numeral of a natural number n is denoted by n. Finally, we write pφ(x˙)q for denoting the function that
with n as argument provides the code of the formula φ(n).
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inconsistency will arise. The ω-rule allows us to infer ∀xφ if we have derived φ(n) for all
n ∈ ω.
The crucial observation by McGee was that there is a two-place primitive recursive
function f , which when applied to a natural number n and the code, i.e., the Go¨del number,
of a sentence φ provides the code of the sentence
Tp. . .T
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n-times
pφq . . .q.
This allowed McGee to define an ω-truth predicate
Tωx := ∀yT f •(y, x)
where f • is a function symbol representing f in Γ.2 A sentence φ is ω-true iff each sentence
resulting from φ by applying any finite number of truth predicate to the sentence is true. By
first-order logic and (UInf) one can easily prove the following characteristics of Tω:
(A1) Tωpφq→ TpTωpφqq
(A2) Tωpφq→ Tpφq
With these prerequisites we can provide a crisp version of McGee’s original proof:
Proof. We start by an application of the Diagonal lemma:
1. γ↔ ¬Tωpγq
2. Tpγq↔ Tp¬Tωpγqq 1,(T-Intro),(T-Imp)
3. Tpγq→ ¬TpTωpγqq 2,(Cons)
4. Tpγq→ ¬Tωpγq 3,A1
5. Tωpγq→ Tpγq A2
6. ¬Tωpγq 4,5
7. γ 1,6
From line 7 and (T-Intro) we may derive
Tpγq
︸︷︷︸
T f •(0,γ),
, TpTpγqq
︸    ︷︷    ︸
T f •(1,pγq),
,TpTpTpγqqq
︸         ︷︷         ︸
T f •(2,pγq),
, . . .
By the ω-rule this yields ∀xT f •(x, pγq), that is, Tωpγq, which contradicts line 6 above. 
2For ease of exposition we avail ourselves to certain function symbols, such as f •, in the language. In this
we follow Halbach (2011) presentation of McGee’s result. McGee (1985) presented his result without assuming
such function symbols.
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McGee’s result adds to a family of inconsistency results, such as, Tarski’s undefinability
result (Tarski (1935)) or Montague’s theorem (Montague (1963)) that point to severe limita-
tions on how truthlike predicates can be. However, as we have seen, we have to go beyond the
resources of classical first-order logic to turn theω-inconsistency result into an inconsistency
result proper. But if these resources, that is, the ω-rule, are made available, McGee’s result
turns out to be a direct consequence of Lo¨b’s theorem and as such a variant of Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem.3 The reason is that in a theory of truth that proves (T-Imp), (UInf)
and is closed under the rule (T-Intro), we can derive the three Lo¨b derivability conditions for
the ω-truth predicate Tω if we allow for application of the ω-rule.4 This implies that we can
derive Lo¨b’s theorem for Tω, which directly contradicts the principle (Cons) because (Cons)
forces the ω-truth predicate to be provably consistent, that is, we can prove ¬Tωp0 = 1q.
Let us make this observation explicit. Lo¨b (1955) showed that if a theory Λ extending Q
the following conditions are satisfied for a predicate P
(D1) Λ ⊢ φ⇒ Λ ⊢ Ppφq
(D2) Λ ⊢ Ppφ→ ψq→ (Ppφq→ Ppψq)
(D3) Λ ⊢ Ppφq→ PpPpφqq
for all φ,ψ ∈ SentLP . Then Λ proves
(L1) Ppφq→ φ⇒ Λ ⊢ φ
(L2) PpPpφq→ φq→ Ppφq
for all φ ∈ SentLP . (L1) is known as Lo¨b’s theorem, whereas (L2) is the so-called formalized
Lo¨b’s theorem. In a theory Σ that is just like the theory Γ of Theorem 1 with the exception
that (Cons) is no longer assumed we may establish both versions of Lo¨b’s theorem for the
predicate Tω.
Theorem 2 (ω-Lo¨b). Let Σ be a theory extending Q in the language LT, which is closed under the
rule
(T-Intro)
φ
Tpφq
and proves
(T-Imp) Tpφ→ ψq→ (Tpφq→ Tpψq)
(UInf) ∀xTpφ(x˙)q→ Tp∀vφ(v)q
for all φ,ψ ∈ SentLT . Let T
ω be defined as above. Then
(i) Σ ⊢ω T
ω
pφq→ φ⇒ Σ ⊢ω φ
(ii) Σ ⊢ω T
ω
pTωpφq→ φq→ Tωpφq.
3See Smorynski (2004) for a discussion of the relation between Lo¨b’s theorem and Go¨del’s second incom-
pleteness theorem.
4There exist ω-consistent theories of this kind thus this observation is non-trivial in the sense that the
application of the ω-rule does not lead to inconsistency, i.e., the explosion of the derivability relation.
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The derivability relation ⊢ω signifies the closure of the classical derivability relalion under
non-embedded applications of the ω-rule.5 As to be expected,Theorem 2 is established by
showing that the three Lo¨b derivability conditions can be proved in Σ for the predicate Tω.
We state this claim in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let Σ be as in Theorem 2. Then for all φ ∈ SentLT
(M1) Σ ⊢ω φ⇒ Σ ⊢ω T
ω
pφq
(M2) Σ ⊢ω T
ω
pφ→ ψq→ (Tωpφq→ Tωpψq)
(M3) Σ ⊢ω T
ω
pφq→ TωpTωpφqq.
Proof. (M1) follows directly from the rule (T-Intro), the ω-rule and the definition of Tω.
(M2) follows from (T-Imp), (T-Intro), the ω-rule and again the definition of Tω. For (M3)
we observe that by (A1) we have Tωpφq → TpTωpφqq, i.e., Tωpφq → T f •(0, pTωpφqq).
By (T-Intro) and (T-Imp) we obtain TpTωpφqq → TpTpTωpφqqq. Then by (A1) we derive
Tωpφq → TpTpTωpφqqq, that is, Tωpφq → T f •(1, pTωpφqq). Clearly, we may repeat this
process and therefore, by an application of the ω-rule, derive Tωpφq → ∀xT f •(x, pTωpφqq).
By definition of Tω this is the desired (M3). 
By Lemma 3, Theorem 2 is a direct corollary of Lo¨b’s original result. Moreover, as we
have already mentioned, McGee’s ω-inconsistency result proves to be a direct corollary of
this result.
Alternative proof of Theorem 1. Since the theory Γ proves (Cons) and thus Γ ⊢ω T
ω
p¬φq →
¬Tωpφq, we have Γ ⊢ Tωp0 = 1q → 0 = 1. By Theorem 2 Lo¨b’s theorem holds for Γ. This
yields the contradiction. 
This observation establishes a firm link between McGee’s theorem and Lo¨b’s theorem.
This connection is of course not too surprising. In their paper “Possible World Semantics
for Modal Notions Conceived as Predicates” Halbach et al. (2003) already remark: “In the
end all limitative results can be derived from Lo¨b’s theorem.” Their observation, however,
depends on rather involved semantic considerations while the present note might serve as
an accessible illustration of this general fact.6
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